

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Cover for Report to the President on Force Protection (1 page)	09/16/1996	P1/b(1)
002. report	Conclusion section of the Report to the President on Force Protection (4 pages)	ca. 09/1996	P1/b(1)
003. memo	Draft memo, re: Command Failures Leading Up To Khobar Towers Bombing (4 pages)	09/1996	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy - Steven Andreasen
OA/Box Number: 3826

FOLDER TITLE:

Khobar Towers, October - December 1996 [Saudi Arabia] [1]

Kara Ellis
2006-0648-F
ke798

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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Section 9/96

SUBJECT: Command Failures Leading Up To Khobar Towers
Bombing

A review of the Downing report suggests that command, operational and organizational failures within the Central Command greatly contributed to the June 25 Khobar Towers tragedy. However, based on a recent letter to the President, it appears that the Secretary of Defense does not intend to hold CINCCENT accountable for failures in the CINC's chain of command. This may be problematic, particularly in light of: (a) underway Air Force efforts to assign accountability within its Service (and General Fogleman's emphasis on accountability); (b) Central Command organizational confusion and split responsibilities vaguely reminiscent of the situation in Mogadishu prior to the October 3, 1993 Ranger raid; and (c) the enhanced authorities granted CINCs by Goldwater-Nichols legislation -- authorities CINCCENT did not choose to exercise. The problematic nature of Secretary Perry's apparent decision needs to be understood within the White House before the drama is played out on the Hill and in the media.

The Downing report summarizes leadership failures at different levels in the military chain of command. Of the report's 26 findings, one attributes command failures at levels above the Commander of the 4404th Wing; two specifically cite failures on the part of the 4404th Wing Commander; two single out DoD; and five detail Central Command failures. The remaining findings cover a variety of subjects (e.g., intelligence, Air Force, State/DoD responsibilities, etc.). Not all failures are of the same degree or magnitude, but there are a variety of command and accountability breakdowns throughout the chain of command.

Command Accountability

On August 30, 1996, "without prior review," the Secretary of Defense transmitted the Downing report to the Secretary of the Air Force for evaluation and appropriate action. Secretary Perry deferred to the Secretary of the Air Force "on any issues regarding the adequacy of individual acts or omissions." In turn, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff designated the 12th Air Force Commander as the disciplinary review authority and General Court-Martial Convening Authority regarding any actions or omissions by Air Force personnel associated with the Khobar Towers bombing.

In forwarding the report to the Secretary of the Air Force "without prior review," the Secretary of Defense correctly seeks to hold Air Force leaders accountable. However, this action, in isolation, excludes the possibility of accountability or

responsibility breakdowns within the chain of command leading downward from CINCCENT to the Service Component Commander(s). Furthermore, in a September 15, 1996 letter to the President, the Secretary of Defense essentially absolves CINCCENT of any omissions or direct failures by stating:

Regarding General Peay, I would note that I recommended him to you for the position of CINCCENT. Obviously, in light of the Khobar Towers event I have examined his performance in force protection and all his other responsibilities. After that review I wish to reaffirm my strong support. No one cares more about our troops than General Peay. He is one of our most experienced combat officers and I can think of no better commander to have in charge of the CENTCOM region at this critical time.

Organizational Confusion

The Downing report concludes that, as a result of their ad hoc origins, the 4044th Wing (Provisional) and the Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) do not possess the support infrastructure found in permanently established organizations. The current organization and structure of the Wing and JTF-SWA are not suited for a long-term presence in Saudi Arabia, particularly under existing threat conditions.

Similarly, the Central Command component commanders retain operational control of forces supporting Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. Operational control of involved Air Force units resides at Shaw Air Force Base, SC -- 7,000 miles from Saudi Arabia. The Commander JTF-SWA assumes tactical control of forces provided by Central Command components supporting SOUTHERN WATCH. (Tactical control is normally limited to local control of movements or maneuvers necessary for accomplishing assigned missions.) Thus, force protection responsibilities and tactical control were not in the same hands at the time of the Khobar bombing.

Following the November 1995 OPM/SANG bombing, CINCCENT gave additional responsibilities to CJTF-SWA, for coordination of force protection in Saudi Arabia. Prior to assuming command of JTF-SWA in April 1996, Major General Kurt Anderson was not briefed by CINCCENT on force protection issues. Without operational control of SOUTHERN WATCH forces, General Anderson did not view his force protection responsibilities as directive in nature. Following the June 1996 Khobar Towers attack, the CINC directed CJTF-SWA to assume full responsibility for force protection of all combatant forces deployed in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH.

Within the Central Command region, there was organizational confusion regarding split responsibilities. This created a situation not totally unlike that in Somalia in the fall of 1993, when U.S. Special Operations Forces in Somalia, though supporting forces involved in the UN mission, reported to the Joint Special Operations Command, which in turn reported directly to CENTCOM. While the chain of command and organizational situation in Saudi Arabia did not in any way mirror that found in Somalia, there are still similarities, in that nearly three years after the Ranger raid, CENTCOM still had not established effective procedures to operationally control forces located in theater.

Unexercised Goldwater-Nichols Authorities

The Goldwater-Nichols legislation expanded and strengthened the CINCs' authority over their service component commands and gave CINCs wide latitude and authority to organize assigned forces to accomplish their missions. [Note: Downing's report also noted that the Air Force Component Command was not organized or structured to execute its full responsibilities for the security of forces in Saudi Arabia and that for some critical functions AFCENT relied upon the Air Combat Command.] It appears CINCCENT did not fully exercise his authorities, and this likely contributed to the confused organizational structure and split responsibilities in the region. In a September 16 press conference, General Downing stated:

The Goldwater-Nichols legislation assigned great power to the unified combatant commanders. I believe the law's intent was to strengthen joint operational command while leaving the services the mission of training, equipping and sustaining the force. Force protection is an operational issue. There are training and equipping pieces to it, but ultimately it is an inherent function of command. Leaving two service components, the Air Force and the Army, in charge from a distant 7,000 miles away in the United States satisfies the letter of Goldwater-Nichols, but it does not satisfy the spirit of the law.

In the absence of an in-theater headquarters, there is some logic to assigning service component commanders operational control over forces involved in military operations. In fact, the three large CENTCOM operations in the Gulf region are each assigned to component commanders: NAVCENT--maritime interdiction; AFCENT--Operation SOUTHERN WATCH; and ARCENT--preposition operations in Qatar and Kuwait. Still, this does not release the CINC from overall responsibility for direction, coordination and oversight. To some extent, it appears the CINC relinquished some of these responsibilities -- at least with regards to SOUTHERN WATCH.

Summary

The 1995 OPM/SANG bombing should have provided a wake-up call to CENTCOM. This does not appear to be the case, however, based on the findings of the Downing report. **The clear sense of urgency, top-down guidance and command supervision commonly evidenced when any task or mission has the commander's attention -- when force protection is a command priority -- was absent at Khobar Towers.** Thus, Secretary Perry's apparent recommendation to the President to relieve CINCCENT of any culpability in the pre-Khobar Towers situation may well prove problematic.

Select Command "Failures"

- **Finding 3: (CENTCOM)** Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and other U.S. Central Command units in the region were not structured and supported to sustain a long-term commitment that involved expanded missions, to include increased force protection from an emerging and viable terrorist threat.
- **Finding 4: (CENTCOM)** Current U.S. Central Command relationships do not contribute to enhanced security for forces operating in the region.
- **Finding 5: (CENTCOM)** Force protection practices are inconsistent in Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf region.
- **Finding 6: (CENTCOM)** There is no theater-specific training guidance for individuals or units deploying to the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility.
- **Finding 14: (CENTCOM)** While the communications architecture in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility supported the flow of intelligence throughout the upper echelons of the chain of command, field units had limited access due to classification restrictions.
- **Finding 19: (Chain of Command)** The chain of command did not provide adequate guidance and support to the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional).
- **Finding 20: (BGen Schwalier)** The Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional) did not adequately protect his forces from a terrorist attack.
- **Finding 21: (BGen Schwalier)** Funding for force protection requirements was not given a high priority by the 4404th Wing (Provisional).

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. report	Response to the Downing Task Force Report Recommendations - (21 pages)	ca. 1996	P1/b(1)
002. note	Handwritten notes from conversation with General Fogelman (6 pages)	07/27/1997	P5

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
Defense Policy - Steven Andreasen
OA/Box Number: 3826

FOLDER TITLE:

Khobar Towers, October - December 1996 [Saudi Arabia] [3]

Kara Ellis
2006-0648-F
ke800

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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File: Kholan Tower

Notes for Fogelman & Leven
7/27/97

(A) An mission - First Rate

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Downing's Perry

Fwd. to Namias Rpt

- ① defending against such an unprecedented attack "uniquely difficult."

Downing

- ① Schwalier - 130 sep. force protection enhancements were undertaken - "may well have saved hundreds of lives by preventing penetration by bombers into the center of the compound."

but

② CO - JTF/SW

(May Gen Franklin)

Memo ~~letter~~ to Schwalier - noted Klobar - "even though as a com. w/ only tac cti did not have this auth"

INITIATIVE

(3) Terry never answered
news - never
raised up chain
any force prot
measures beyond
his capability to
correct (i.e. moving
fence perimeter out). -
(p. 72) did not mention F.P.
in end-of-term rpt.

(4) neglect not reg. though
~~not~~ in vul. assess. form
Jan 96 - even 200 15
(14) ~~fact~~ would have caused
casualties

(5) emphasis on internal
prot - external prot Saudi
resp - but Terry never
raised

(6) "never thought" of moving people
from outside rooms.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Jumpen
DCS/XO

no Deputy to

Pos. doesn't have to
be filled by 2-star

1-star

From Ad + Senate
confirmed for 2 yrs

Only POS
can take
someone off
2-star,
on secy
re

Jan-Feb 97
(original per
at date)
Sec AF
order to delay
to delay
delayed
this

TELECON W/ FOGELMAN
THINGS TO DO

Call

Sunday
1:10
1:30

up to tell POTUS

his & don't want

to know that

in 93

recom. negs

Don't want
refill

dilemma -

don't want to

see POTUS

put on their

shirt

more fundamental

things - 0-5's

0-6's watching doc

care to see how it's

going to go - what it

means to be a

CO in field & what

you can expect

to rx from this

city

THINGS TO DO...

meeting of OSG

study - opt - guide

under Green Rel.

in Dec

no one wanted to

look at pro-active

things Sch did;

just looking at

Green's. Lack of

fairness.

POTUS in last seat

happy to go against

his troops in field

will try to take

actions to try to

prevent

"Did you talk to

POTUS"

issue not w/

President-

Very not interested

THINGS TO DO...

Telecon w/
Sec Def

APLS :

Longman

for up to date
info.

2005

put in...

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. memo	Wukk Wechsler to Dick Clarke, re: Political Ramifications of a Third Bombing (1 page)	ca. 07/1996	P5
002. cable	Re: Al Khubar Bombing (2 pages)	07/02/1996	P1/b(1)
003. report	Update on the Khubar Bombing (6 pages)	07/26/1996	P1/b(1)
004. minutes	Handwritten minutes from meeting re: Saudi Arabia (4 pages)	07/22/1996	P1/b(1), P5
005. cable	Re: Terrorism (4 pages)	07/22/1996	P1/b(1)
006. memo	Re: Groups Threaten US Interests (1 page)	07/22/1996	P1/b(1)
007. memo	Re: Groups Threaten US Interests (1 page)	07/22/1996	P1/b(1)
008. cable	Re: FBI Transportation (2 pages)	07/18/1996	P1/b(1), P6/b(6), b(7)(C), b(7)(E)
009. cable	To the Secretary of State, re: Terrorism (4 pages)	07/25/1996	P1/b(1)
010. email	Steven Simon to Richard Clarke, re: shipment (1 page)	07/22/1996	P1/b(1)
011. report	Update on the Khubar Bombing (6 pages)	07/26/1996	P1/b(1)
012a. memo	Richard Clarke to Anthony Lake, re: Post-Riyadh Bombing Security Review (1 page)	02/26/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
TNT-Simon
OA/Box Number: 2240

FOLDER TITLE:

Khobar Towers [Saudi Arabia] [1]

Kara Ellis
2006-0648-F
ke807

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012b. paper	Re: Antiterrorism Task Force (5 pages)	ca. 02/1996	P1/b(1)
012c. paper	Re: Senior-Level Assment Team Visits (3 pages)	ca. 02/1996	P1/b(1)
013. paper	Re: US presence in Saudi Arabia (4 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
014. minutes	Handwritten minutes from meeting re: Khobar Bombing (9 pages)	n.d.	P1/b(1), P5
015. list	Review of Terrorist Threat Post-Khobar Towers (1 page)	n.d.	P1/b(1)
016. report	Re: Consequence of Dhahran Bombing (14 pages)	07/12/1996	P1/b(1)
017. agenda	CSG Agenda (2 pages)	07/09/1996	P1/b(1)
018. memo	Richard Clarke to Samuel Berger, re: Terrorism (5 pages)	07/08/1996	P1/b(1)
019. memo	Richard Clarke to Samuel Berger, re: Terrorism (5 pages)	07/08/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
National Security Council
TNT-Simon
OA/Box Number: 2240

FOLDER TITLE:

Khobar Towers [Saudi Arabia] [1]

Kara Ellis
2006-0648-F
ke807

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MEMORANDUM FOR DICK CLARKE

FROM: WILL WECHSLER

SUBJECT: Political Ramifications of a Third Bombing

Terrorism is a psychological weapon. Terrorism against U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia is unlikely to ever prevent us from fulfilling our military missions in the region. At some point, however, losses from a series of terrorist attacks will begin to be considered politically unacceptable.

Depending on the exact circumstances, a third bombing in Saudi Arabia may meet this threshold. Even if, at that point, we are still unable to determine culpability and order retaliation, political pressure will nonetheless sharply increase for the President to change policy and take "decisive" action -- either withdrawing from Saudi Arabia (as Reagan did in Lebanon) or taking unconsidered military action (as Carter did in Iran). This pressure will need to be confronted by the President at the earliest stage of such a crisis.

The least desirable reaction to a third bombing would be for the President to appear to waffle, first deciding on what may be perceived as a "defensive" posture (further enhancing security, sending anti-terrorism equipment, continuing the investigations, etc.) then succumbing to political pressures to "do something," potentially making matters worse (moving ships into the Gulf without an explicit mission, striking "suspected" terrorists and risking collateral civilian casualties, taking premature actions against Iran or Syria, etc.). Therefore, at the outset of such a crisis, the President should forcefully reject both alternatives and reaffirm his commitment to a measured, consistent response.

This course will undoubtedly come at a political cost, but so would the alternatives. The key, however, will be directing the President's decision-making process away from minutia and toward confronting this issue at the earliest possible stage in the crisis, then ensuring that his decision becomes well understood.

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	White House Situation Room to Steven Andreasen, et al., re: WHSR Evening Summary 25 June 1996 (5 pages)	06/25/1996	P1/b(1)
002. email	Kenneth Pollack to Joseph Sestak, re: Message to Fahd on Bombing (2 pages)	06/25/1996	P1/b(1)
003. email	M. K. Friedrich to Jane Baker, et al., re: Night Update (2 pages)	06/25/1996	P1/b(1)
004. email	White House Situation Room to Todd Black, et al., re: WHSR Log 25 June 1996 (6 pages)	06/26/1996	P1/b(1)
005. email	White House Situation Room to Todd Black, et al., re: WHSR Log 26 Jun 96 (5 pages)	06/27/1996	P1/b(1)
006. email	Steven Simon to Brian Cullin, re: FBI Takes Lead in Khobar Investigation (1 page)	06/27/1996	P5
007. email	White House Situation Room to Stephen Andreasen, et al., re: WHSR Evening Summary 27 June 1996 (5 pages)	06/27/1996	P1/b(1)
008. email	White House Situation Room to Todd Black, et al., re: WHSR Log 27 June 1996 (4 pages)	06/28/1996	P1/b(1)
009. email	Richard Clarke to Jane Baker, et al., re: DOD Vulnerability Review (2 pages)	06/28/1996	P1/b(1)
010. email	Kathrine O'Loughlin to Steven Pifer, re: FW: Weekly Emphasis List (2 pages)	06/28/1996	P1/b(1)
011. email	Kathrine O'Loughlin to Sandra Kristoff, re: FW: Weekly Emphasis List (2 pages)	06/28/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Khobar])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/25/1996 - 06/30/1996]

Kara Ellis
2006-0648-F
ke859

RESTRICTION CODES

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. email	Stephen Grummon to Richard Clarke, re: RE: Tasker for TL (2 pages)	06/28/1996	P1/b(1)
013. email	Andrew Sens to Jodi Kessinger, re: FW: Tasker for TL (2 pages)	06/28/1996	P1/b(1)
014. email	Mark Parris to Stephen Grummon, re: RE: Tasker for TL (3 pages)	06/28/1996	P1/b(1)
015. email	Steven Simon to Stephen Grummon, re: Saudi Q/A (4 pages)	06/28/1996	P1/b(1)
016. email	Macarthur Deshazer to Kathrine O'Laughlin, re: FW: Weekly Emphasis List (2 pages)	06/28/1996	P1/b(1)
017. email	White House Situation Room to Steven Andreasen, et al., re: WHSR Evening Summery 28 Jun 96 (5 pages)	06/28/1996	P1/b(1)
018. email	Richard Clarke to Peter Bass, et al., re: Saudi Bombing (2 pages)	06/28/1996	P1/b(1)
019. email	Kathrine O'Loughlin to Todd Black, et al., re: Weekly Emphasis List (2 pages)	06/28/1996	P1/b(1)
020. email	Jodi Kessinger to Peter Black, re: RE: Tasker for TL (3 pages)	06/28/1996	P1/b(1)
021. email	Jodi Kessinger to Richard Clarke, re: RE: Tasker for TL (3 pages)	06/28/1997	P1/b(1)
022. email	White House Situation Room to Todd Black, et al., re: WHSR Log 28 Jun 96 (5 pages)	06/29/1996	P1/b(1)
023. email	Richard Clarke to Peter Bass, et al., re: Saudi Bombing - Saturday Report (4 pages)	06/29/1996	P1/b(1), P6/b(6), b(7)(C), b(7)(E)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Khobar])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/25/1996 - 06/30/1996]

Kara Ellis
2006-0648-F
ke859

RESTRICTION CODES

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RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
024. email	White House Situation Room to Todd Black, et al., re: WHSR Log 30 June 1996 (4 pages)	06/30/1996	P1/b(1)
025. email	Richard Clarke to Rand Beers and Steven Simon, re: Questions re: Khobar Bombing (3 pages)	06/30/1996	P1/b(1)
026. email	Ricahrd Clarke to Rand Beers and Steven Simon, re: Theory on Khobar Bombing (4 pages)	06/30/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Khobar])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[06/25/1996 - 06/30/1996]

Kara Ellis
2006-0648-F
ke859

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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WJC LIBRARY COPY

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 27 June 96 09:25
FROM Simon, Steven N.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: FBI Takes Lead in Khobar Investigation [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Cullin, Brian P.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY

????????????????????????????????

From: Cullin, Brian P.
To: @GLOBAL - Global Affairs; @DEFENSE - Defense Policy; @NESASIA -
NE/South
Asia
CC: @PRESS - Public Affairs; @SDO-WHSR Senior Duty Officers
Subject: FBI Takes Lead in Khobar Investigation [UNCLASSIFIED]
Date: Thursday, June 27, 1996 09:18 AM

Need guidance on putting this unusual development in the proper context ...
everyone including DoD finds this quite a dramatic development with respect
to our Saudi relations and previous investigations where they took lead in
their own country. Please advise. Thanks, Brian

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Steven Brennan to Peter Bass, et al., re: President Clinton - King Fahd MEMCON 1 SEP 1996 (3 pages)	09/01/1996	P1/b(1)
002. email	Richard Clarke to Stephen Grummon, et al., re: Iran Memo (3 pages)	09/04/1996	P1/b(1)
003. email	Steven Simon to Daniel Benjamin, et al., re: Terror Bkfst (5 pages)	09/04/1996	P5
004. email	Steven Simon to Richard Clarke, re: Input for terr bkfst memo (5 pages)	09/04/1996	P5
005. email	Steven Naplan to Julia Moffett, re: terror bkfst memo (5 pages)	09/04/1996	P5
006. email	Kathrine O'Loughlin to Robert Suettinger, re: FW: Weekly Emphasis List (3 pages)	09/06/1996	P1/b(1)
007. email	Kathrine O'Loughlin to Macarthur Deshazer, re: FW: Weekly Emphasis List (3 pages)	09/06/1996	P1/b(1)
008. email	Kathrine O'Loughlin to Steven Pifer, re: FW: Weekly Emphasis List (2 pages)	09/06/1996	P1/b(1)
009. email	Kathrine O'Loughlin to Todd Black, et al., re: Weekly Emphasis List (3 pages)	09/06/1996	P1/b(1)
010. email	John Feeley to Kathrine O'Loughlin, re: RE: Weekly Emphasis List (2 pages)	09/06/1996	P1/b(1)
011. email	Stephen Grummon to Steven Simon, re: [Memo for Anthony Lake] (2 pages)	09/11/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Khobar])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/01/1996 - 09/11/1996]

Kara Ellis
2006-0648-F
ke869

RESTRICTION CODES

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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).
RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. email	Steven Simon to Richard LeBaron, re: [talking points] (2 pages)	09/11/1996	P1/b(1)
013. email	Richard LeBaron to Peter Bass, re: [talking points] (2 pages)	09/11/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Khobar])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/01/1996 - 09/11/1996]

Kara Ellis
2006-0648-F
ke869

RESTRICTION CODES

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 04 September 96 09:26
FROM Simon, Steven N.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]Terror Bkfst

TO Benjamin, Daniel
Blinken, Antony J.
Clarke, Richard A.
Gray, Wendy
Moffett, Julia
Naplan, Steven J.
Showalter, Victoria A.

CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE

TEXT_BODY

[[TERRBKFT.DOC : 2370 in TERRBKFT.DOC]]
Steve/Julia:

Attached is something for your bkfst memo that hasn't been cleared by Dick yet. Keep it as a placeholder, though, until he's looked at it.

Thanks, S

**ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE** 4 September 96 9:18

**ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME** TERRBKFT.DOC

Background

Significant Recent Events: Apart from the bombing of al-Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and the unproved possibility of a bomb on TWA 800, the major events of 1995-96 included: the sarin subway attack in Tokyo, the bombing of OPM/SANG headquarters in Riyadh, the killing of U.S. embassy employees in Karachi, killing of two U.S. missionaries by the FARC in Colombia, the kidnapping and probable murder of of a U.S. hostage in Kashmir, the attempted assassination of President Mubarak in Addis Ababa, the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, three suicide attacks against civilians in Israel,

the murder of an Iranian opposition member in Paris, the destruction of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, eight separate bombings in France and a continuing high level of terrorist violence in Algeria, and bombings in London and Manchester. Other potentially horrific acts, such as the bombings of twelve U.S. airliners over the Pacific, were prevented.

This partial list of recent attacks was carried out by an extremely diverse range of actors: an apocalyptic sect, radical political movements with or without the support of state sponsors, intelligence agencies of state sponsors, separatist movements, and criminal gangs that evolved from armed political factions.

Issues: There are three main issues:

- ☐ What can be done to defeat or deter attacks by terrorists who are not driven by a political program, but are motivated by rage? (One commentator observed that there was no claim of responsibility for al Khobar, because the attackers' only constituency was God and that he would know who was responsible.)
- ☐ Is the offense winning, because the weapons available to it are becoming more potent, especially in terms of their capacity to inflict large numbers of casualties? Although chemical and biological weapons come immediately to mind, high energy chemical explosives, let alone fertilizer, can inflict appalling damage.
- ☐ Are we moving into an era when terrorism is emerging as a strategic, rather than tactical threat? Although we have never attributed a strategic significance to terrorism, the Hamas attacks in Israel prior to the election did have a strategic impact. In the hypothetical case that the U.S. were confronted by a rapid fire sequence of devastating bomb attacks in Saudi Arabia, the effect could have been strategic in scope.

Questions

- ☐ How should we respond to attackers driven by rage and religious zeal, rather than a political agenda or ideology?

- ☐ What are the options for dealing with failed states, like Afghanistan, that provide a home for such groups?
- ☐ Do such groups have a life-cycle, which would lead us to expect them to diminish? Or are they here to stay?
- ☐ Does terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction, including large conventional bombs, move us into a new era of vulnerability?
What should we be doing about it?
- ☐ Does the combination of terrorists' nihilism and technological sophistication transform the threat from a tactical one to a strategic one?

Bios

Brian Jenkins: Until recently was the RAND Corporation's expert on terrorism. He is now a security consultant with Kroll Associates.

Continues to maintain the best data base on terrorism outside of government. Thoughtful, sober. Likely to support what we are doing.

Jerrold Green: Heads RAND's Middle East program. Political scientist with regional expertise as well as strong methodological skills. Knowledgeable about domestic and international terrorism. Works with local law enforcement on the issue. Supports an approach that is essentially our own.

Bob Oakley: Former U.S. ambassador, now with NDU. Represented U.S. in Somalia during the intervention. Knowledgeable about terrorism and the constraints on U.S. response options. If he is critical, his comments will be constructive. He is not politically active or close to the media.

Judith Miller: Journalist, formerly with the New York Times, who just completed a Twentieth Century Fund Fellowship. Her new book is Middle East fundamentalism. Perceptive, with a strong common sense approach to issues. She probably knows little about the Administration's approach to terrorism.

Morris Busby: Former U.S. Ambassador and head of the State Department Bureau that covered both terrorism and narcotics during the mid-to-late eighties. Has a solid reputation and is likely to support Administration initiatives.

Richard Haass: Senior Director for Near East and South Asia on the NSC staff during the Bush Administration. Now head of the foreign policy studies program at the Brookings Institution. Although he has not specialized in terrorism, he is knowledgeable about the issue. His has written primarily on the use of force. Likely to be supportive, although he may quibble on areas of emphasis.

Gary Sick: Former NSC staffer, worked on the Iran hostage crisis. Expert on U.S. policy toward Iran, now with the Ford Foundation/Columbia University. Although he has no illusions about Iran, he is critical of dual containment and believes we need to find some common ground with Iran.

Jeremy Rosner will also be attending.

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 04 September 96 09:27
FROM Simon, Steven N.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT [UNCLASSIFIED]Input for terr bkfst memo
TO Clarke, Richard A.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY [[TERRBKFT.DOC : 2346 in TERRBKFT.DOC]]
For your comments/clearance.
Thanks, S

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE 4 September 96 9:26

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME TERRBKFT.DOC

Background

Significant Recent Events: Apart from the bombing of al-Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and the unproved possibility of a bomb on TWA 800, the major events of 1995-96 included: the sarin subway attack in Tokyo, the bombing of OPM/SANG headquarters in Riyadh, the killing of U.S. embassy employees in Karachi, killing of two U.S. missionaries by the FARC in Colombia, the kidnapping and probable murder of of a U.S. hostage in Kashmir, the attempted assassination of President Mubarak in Addis Ababa, the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, three suicide attacks against civilians in Israel, the murder of an Iranian opposition member in Paris, the destruction of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, eight separate bombings in France and a continuing high level of terrorist violence in Algeria, and bombings in London and Manchester. Other potentially horrific acts, such as the bombings of twelve U.S. airliners over the Pacific, were prevented.

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M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 04 September 96 14:11
FROM Naplan, Steven J.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT terror bkfst memo [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Moffett, Julia
CARBON_COPY Naplan, Steven J.
TEXT_BODY [[TERRBKFT.DOC : 3630 in TERRBKFT.DOC]]

ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE 4 September 96 14:11

ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME TERRBKFT.DOC

Background

Significant Recent Events: Apart from the bombing of al-Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia and the unproved possibility of a bomb on TWA 800, the major events of 1995-96 included: the sarin subway attack in Tokyo, the bombing of OPM/SANG headquarters in Riyadh, the killing of U.S. embassy employees in Karachi, killing of two U.S. missionaries by the FARC in Colombia, the kidnapping and probable murder of a U.S. hostage in Kashmir, the attempted assassination of President Mubarak in Addis Ababa, the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, three suicide attacks against civilians in Israel, the murder of an Iranian opposition member in Paris, the destruction of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad, eight separate bombings in France and a continuing high level of terrorist violence in Algeria, and bombings in London and Manchester. Other potentially horrific acts, such as the bombings of twelve U.S. airliners over the Pacific, were prevented.

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Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Peter Bass to Mary Wiley, re: TL note (2 pages)	09/13/1996	P1/b(1)
002. email	Kathrine O'Loughlin to Macarthur Deshazer, re: FW: Weekly Emphasis List (3 pages)	09/13/1996	P1/b(1)
003. email	Kathrine O'Loughlin to Todd Black, et al., re: Elist (3 pages)	09/13/1996	P1/b(1)
004. email	Kathleen Cooper to Gordon Bendick, re: RE: Request from Danvers (2 pages)	09/16/1996	P1/b(1)
005. email	James Seaton to Joseph Sestak, re: Downing--Command Failures (6 pages)	09/18/1996	P5
006. email	Michael Sheehan to Richard Clarke and James Lindsay, re: POTUS Memo/TL Pts for Prebrief (7 pages)	09/20/1996	P1/b(1)
007. email	Mark Parris to Stephen Grummon, re: FW: TL meeting with POTUS (2 pages)	09/20/1996	P1/b(1)
008. email	Kathrine O'Loughlin to Steven Pifer, re: FW: Weekly Emphasis List (3 pages)	09/20/1996	P1/b(1)
009. email	Michael Sheehan to Steven Andreasen, re; Scope memo (5 pages)	09/20/1996	P1/b(1)
010. email	Michael Sheehan to Antony Blinken, et al., re: TL memo and scope (6 pages)	09/20/1996	P1/b(1)
011. email	Stephen Grummon to Steven Simon, re: clearance (5 pages)	09/20/1996	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
MSMail-Record (Sept 94-Sept 97) ([Khobar])
OA/Box Number: 590000

FOLDER TITLE:

[09/12/1996 - 09/20/1996]

Kara Ellis
2006-0648-F
ke870

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
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PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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WJC LIBRARY COPY

M S M a i l

DATE-TIME 18 September 96 07:29
FROM Seaton, James B.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Downing--Command Failures [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Sestak, Joseph A.
CARBON_COPY NO CC's on THIS MESSAGE
TEXT_BODY
Thanks Joe. I hope to give this to Bob this morning. Semper Fi, Jim
[[DOWNING.DOC : 1818 in DOWNING.DOC]]
ATTACHMENT
FILE DATE 18 September 96 7:28
ATTACHMENT
FILE NAME DOWNING.DOC

SUBJECT: Command Failures Leading Up To Khobar Towers Bombing

A review of the Downing report suggests that operational and organizational failures within the Central Command contributed to the June 25 Khobar Towers tragedy. It appears, however, that the Secretary of Defense does not intend to hold CINCCENT accountable for failures in the CINC's chain of command. This may be problematic, particularly in light of: (a) underway Air Force efforts to assign accountability within its Service (and General Fogleman's emphasis on accountability); (b) Central Command organizational confusion and split responsibilities vaguely reminiscent of the situation in Mogadishu prior to the October 3, 1993 Ranger raid; and (c) the enhanced authorities granted to CINCs by Goldwater-Nichols legislation
-- authorities CINCCENT did not choose to exercise.

The Downing report summarizes leadership failures at different levels in the military chain of command. Of the report's 26 findings, one attributes command failures at levels above the Commander of the 4404th Wing; two specifically cite failures on

the part of the 4404th Wing Commander; two single out DoD; and five detail Central Command failures. The remaining findings cover a variety of subjects (e.g., intelligence, Air Force, State/DoD responsibilities, etc.). Not all failures are of the same degree or magnitude, but there are a variety of command and accountability breakdowns throughout the chain of command.

Command Accountability

On August 30, 1996, "without prior review," the Secretary of Defense transmitted the Downing report to the Secretary of the Air Force for evaluation and appropriate action. Secretary Perry deferred to the Secretary of the Air Force "on any issues regarding the adequacy of individual acts or omissions." In turn, the Secretary of the Air Force and the Chief of Staff designated the 12th Air Force Commander as the disciplinary review authority and General Court-Martial Convening Authority regarding any actions or omissions by Air Force personnel associated with the Khobar Towers bombing.

In forwarding the report to the Secretary of the Air Force "without prior review," the Secretary of Defense essentially implies a failure in Air Force leadership and excludes the possibility of accountability or responsibility breakdowns within the chain of command leading downward from the Central Command Commander-in-Chief (CINC) to the Service Component Commander(s). Furthermore, in a September 15, 1996 letter to the President, the Secretary of Defense essentially absolves CINCCENT of any omissions or direct failures by stating:

Regarding General Peay, I would note that I recommended him to you for the position of CINCCENT. Obviously, in light of the Khobar Towers event I have examined his performance in force protection and all his other responsibilities. After that review I wish to reaffirm my strong support. No one cares more about our troops than General Peay. He is one of our most experienced combat officers and I can think of no better commander to have in charge of the CENTCOM region at this

critical time.

Organizational Confusion

The Downing report concludes that, as a result of their ad hoc origins, the 4044th Wing (Provisional) and the Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA) do not possess the support infrastructure found in permanently established organizations.

The

current organization and structure of the Wing and JTF-SWA are not

suited for a long-term presence in Saudi Arabia, particularly under

existing threat conditions.

Similarly, the Central Command component commanders retain operational control of forces supporting Operation SOUTHERN WATCH.

Operational control of involved Air Force units resides at Shaw Air

Force Base, SC -- 7,000 miles from Saudi Arabia. The

Commander

JTF-SWA assumes tactical control of forces provided by Central Command components supporting SOUTHERN WATCH. (Tactical control is

normally limited to local control of movements or maneuvers necessary

for accomplishing assigned missions.) Thus, force protection responsibilities and tactical control were not in the same hands at

the time of the Khobar bombing.

Following the November 1995 OPM/SANG bombing, CINCCENT gave additional responsibilities to CJTF-SWA, for coordination of force

protection in Saudi Arabia. Prior to assuming command of JTF-SWA in

April 1996, Major General Kurt Anderson was not briefed by CINCCENT

on force protection issues. Without operational control of SOUTHERN

WATCH forces, General Anderson did not view his force protection

responsibilities as directive in nature. Following the June 1996

Khobar Towers attack, the CINC directed CJTF-SWA to assume full responsibility for force protection of all combatant forces deployed

in support of Operation SOUTHERN WATCH.

Within the Central Command region, there was organizational

confusion regarding split responsibilities. This created a situation not totally unlike that in Somalia in the fall of 1993, when U.S. Special Operations Forces in Somalia, though supporting forces involved in the UN mission, reported to the Joint Special Operations Command, which in turn reported directly to CENTCOM. While the chain of command and organizational situation in Saudi Arabia did not in any way mirror that found in Somalia, there are still similarities, in that nearly three years after the Ranger raid, CENTCOM still had not established effective procedures to operationally control forces located in theater.

Unexercised Goldwater-Nichols Authorities
The Goldwater-Nichols legislation expanded and strengthened the CINCs' authority over their service component commands and gave CINCs wide latitude and authority to organize assigned forces to accomplish their missions. [Note: Downing's report also noted that the Air Force Component Command was not organized or structured to execute its full responsibilities for the security of forces in Saudi Arabia and that for some critical functions AFCENT relied upon the Air Combat Command.] It appears CINCCENT did not fully exercise his authorities, and this likely contributed to the confused organizational structure and split responsibilities in the region. In a September 16 press conference, General Downing stated:

The Goldwater-Nichols legislation assigned great power to the unified combatant commanders. I believe the law's intent was to strengthen joint operational command while leaving the services the mission of training, equipping and sustaining the force. Force protection is an operational issue. There are training and equipping pieces to it, but ultimately it is an inherent function of command. Leaving two service components, the Air Force and the Army, in charge from a distant 7,000 miles away in the United States satisfies the letter of Goldwater-Nichols,

but it does not satisfy the spirit of the law.

In the absence of an in-theater headquarters, there is some logic to assigning service component commanders operational control over forces involved in military operations. In fact, the three large CENTCOM operations in the Gulf region are each assigned to component commanders: NAVCENT--maritime interdiction; AFCENT--Operation SOUTHERN WATCH; and ARCENT--preposition operations in Qatar and Kuwait. Still, this does not release the CINC from overall responsibility for direction, coordination and oversight. To some extent, it appears the CINC relinquished some of these responsibilities -- at least with regards to SOUTHERN WATCH.

Summary

The 1995 OPM/SANG bombing should have provided a wake-up call to CENTCOM. This does not appear to be the case, however, based on the findings of the Downing report. The clear sense of urgency, top-down guidance and command supervision commonly evidenced when any task or mission has the commander's attention -- when force protection is a command priority -- was absent at Khobar Towers. Thus, Secretary Perry's apparent recommendation to the President to relieve CINCCENT of any culpability in the pre-Khobar Towers situation may well prove problematic.

Select Command "Failures"

- ☐ Finding 3: (CENTCOM) Joint Task Force-Southwest Asia and other U.S. Central Command units in the region were not structured and supported to sustain a long-term commitment that involved

expanded missions, to include increased force protection from an emerging and viable terrorist threat.

☐ Finding 4: (CENTCOM) Current U.S. Central Command relationships do not contribute to enhanced security for forces operating in the region.

☐ Finding 5: (CENTCOM) Force protection practices are inconsistent in Saudi Arabia and the Arabian Gulf region.

☐ Finding 6: (CENTCOM) There is no theater-specific training guidance for individuals or units deploying to the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility.

☐ Finding 14: (CENTCOM) While the communications architecture in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility supported the flow of intelligence throughout the upper echelons of the chain of command, field units had limited access due to classification restrictions.

☐ Finding 19: (Chain of Command) The chain of command did not provide adequate guidance and support to the Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional).

☐ Finding 20: (BGen Schwalier) The Commander, 4404th Wing (Provisional) did not adequately protect his forces from a terrorist attack.

☐ Finding 21: (BGen Schwalier) Funding for force protection requirements was not given a high priority by the 4404th Wing (Provisional).

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Robert Malley to Kathleen Cooper, re: MEMCON (7 pages)	10/04/1999	P1/b(1)
002. email	Mona Sutphen to Bruce Riedel, re: RE: Common Ground letter (2 pages)	10/05/1999	P1/b(1), b(7)(E)
003. email	Bathsheba Crocker to Brian Merchant and Mona Sutphen, re: RE: Dissemination of 003045 re Khobar (1 page)	10/06/1999	P1/b(1)
004. email	Mona Sutphen to Brian Merchant and Bathsheba Crocker, re: RE: Dissemination of 003045 re Khobar (1 page)	10/06/1999	P1/b(1)
005. email	Matthew Schaefer to Kenneth Pollack, re: #7133 Response to Governor Schafer on Iran (3 pages)	10/06/1999	P5
006. email	Kenneth Pollack to Felicia Jones, re: #7133 Response to Governor Schafer on Iran (4 pages)	10/07/1999	P5
007. email	Kathleen Cooper to Bruce Riedel, re: Iran Message (2 pages)	10/07/1999	P1/b(1)
008. email	Bruce Riedel to Mona Sutphen and Bathsheba Crocker, re: FW: Iran Message (2 pages)	10/07/1999	P1/b(1)
009. email	Kenneth Pollack to Mathew Schaefer, re: #7133 Response to Governor Schafer on Iran (4 pages)	10/07/1999	P5
010. email	Bathsheba Crocker to Bruce Riedel, re: RE: Iran Message (2 pages)	10/11/1999	P1/b(1)
011. email	Bruce Riedel to Bathsheba Crocker, et al., re: [Iran] (1 page)	10/12/1999	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Record (Sept 97- Jan 01) ([Khobar])
OA/Box Number: 620000

FOLDER TITLE:

[10/04/1999 - 10/12/1999]

Kara Ellis
2006-0648-F
ke908

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

WJC LIBRARY COPY

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/6/99 10:05:34 PM
FROM Schaefer, Matthew P. (INTECON)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: #7133 Response to Governor Schafer on Iran [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)

CARBON_COPY Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Guarnieri, Valerie N. (MULTI)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Feldman, Daniel F. (MULTI)

TEXT_BODY

Ken:

Yes I can certainly live with this. Also just to be clear and so there is no disconnect, my main point was that we are not treating Iran differently than other embargoed countries when it comes to ag credits -- the policy change did not allow credits for any of the currently embargoed countries. The interesting question will be if and when we do revisit the issue whether we treat the availability of credits as a general policy change applicable to all embargoed countries (like the food and medicine exemption itself) or whether we attempt to make country specific determinations on the availability of such credits. My hunch is that your shop and USDA may not agree on this. In any event, I did not mean to suggest that if Iran gave the signal that they would buy, that we should immediately make credits available -- that would certainly not reflect the lack of consensus among agencies.

Thanks,

Matt

-----Original

Message-----

From: Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)

Sent: Wednesday,

October 06, 1999 7:44 PM

To: Schaefer, Matthew P. (INTECON)

Cc: Jones,

Felicia A. (NESA); Guarnieri, Valerie N. (MULTI); Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)

Subject: FW: #7133 Response to Governor Schafer on

Iran [UNCLASSIFIED]

Matt:

Most of your changes look good but I do have some problems. In the Berger memo, I made some organizational changes and restored our sentence that Iranian behavior does not merit extension of credits at this time. This is the key issue for us. Even if the Iranians were willing to buy our wheat if we extended credits we would adamantly oppose such sales as undermining our policy toward Iran. This is a big, fall-on-our-swords issue for us. With Khobar hanging over our heads, we don't want to suggest to anyone we're about to start extending credits to Iran if they were receptive.

In the letter itself, I want to keep the sentence laying out our three key problems with Iran. We believe it important to always make those points for a variety of reasons. In addition, I put one of your key sentences into the conditional; here as well, I don't want Schafer to think that the only thing standing in the way of extending credits to Iran is the fact that they don't want to buy from us.

See my changes below. Note that I accepted all of your other changes. What you now have is a clean copy with my edits to your and Dan's changes. Let me know if you can live with this.

Thanks,

-
Ken

-----Original Message-----

From: Schaefer, Matthew P. (INTECON)

Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 1999 7:07 PM

To: Jones, Felicia A.

(NESA); Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA); Guarnieri, Valerie N. (MULTI);

Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS); @HAMMONDS

Subject: FW: #7133 Response

to Governor Schafer on Iran [UNCLASSIFIED]

Clear with the changes in line with our phone discussion. Important to note that credits not available under the policy change for any of the currently embargoed countries.

-----Original Message-----

From: Shapiro, Daniel B.
(LEGIS)

Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 1999 3:23 PM
To: Jones, Felicia
A. (NESA)
Cc: @MULTILAT - Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs;
@LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @INTECON - Economic Affairs;
@NESASIA
- NE/South Asia
Subject: FW: #7133 Response to Governor Schafer
on Iran [UNCLASSIFIED]

I clear with a couple of edits to the letter.
One of them "not" vice "never" is, I think, very significant because
of our recent position on the Ashcroft amendment.

-----Original
Message-----
From: Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Sent: Tuesday, October
05, 1999 12:46 PM
To: Guarnieri, Valerie N. (MULTI); Shapiro, Daniel
B. (LEGIS); Schaefer, Matthew P. (INTECON)
Cc: @INTECON - Economic
Affairs; @MULTILAT - Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs; @NESASIA
- NE/South Asia
Subject: #7133 Response to Governor Schafer on
Iran [UNCLASSIFIED]

We are requesting clearance on the response
to Governor Schafer re: Iran. The package is attached below. Thanks
in advance.

<< File: 7133srb.doc >> << File: 7133ltr.doc
>> << File: 7133bc.doc >>

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/7/99 7:32:21 AM
FROM Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT FW: #7133 Response to Governor Schafer on Iran [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
CARBON_COPY Cooper, Kathleen H. (NESA)

TEXT_BODY

Felicia:

Package 7133 is now good to go. Place substitute Dan Feldman for Val Guarnieri as concurring for Multilat. I have made all of the changes to the copies on the G drive, so if you just pull up the files they will be ready to go out. I'd appreciate it if you could make sure this goes forward today.

Thanks,

- Ken

-----Original

Message-----

From: Schaefer, Matthew P. (INTECON)

Sent: Wednesday,

October 06, 1999 10:06 PM

To: Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)

Cc: Jones,

Felicia A. (NESA); Guarnieri, Valerie N. (MULTI); Shapiro, Daniel

B. (LEGIS); Feldman, Daniel F. (MULTI)

Subject: RE: #7133 Response

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Sent: Wednesday,

October 06, 1999 7:44 PM

To: Schaefer, Matthew P. (INTECON)

Cc: Jones,

Felicia A. (NESA); Guarnieri, Valerie N. (MULTI); Shapiro, Daniel

B. (LEGIS)

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Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 1999 7:07 PM

To: Jones, Felicia A.

(NESA); Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA); Guarnieri, Valerie N. (MULTI);

Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS); @HAMMONDS

Subject: FW: #7133 Response

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in line with our phone discussion. Important to note that credits
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(LEGIS)

Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 1999 3:23 PM

To: Jones, Felicia

A. (NESA)

Cc: @MULTILAT - Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs;

@LEGISLAT - Legislative Affairs; @INTECON - Economic Affairs;

@NESASIA

- NE/South Asia

Subject: FW: #7133 Response to Governor Schafer

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05, 1999 12:46 PM

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B. (LEGIS); Schaefer, Matthew P. (INTECON)

Cc: @INTECON - Economic

Affairs; @MULTILAT - Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs; @NESASIA

- NE/South Asia

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<< File: 7133srb.doc >> << File: 7133ltr.doc
>> << File: 7133bc.doc >>

Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 10/7/99 7:23:31 AM
FROM Pollack, Kenneth M. (NESA)
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT RE: #7133 Response to Governor Schafer on Iran [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Schaefer, Matthew P. (INTECON)

CARBON_COPY Jones, Felicia A. (NESA)
Guarnieri, Valerie N. (MULTI)
Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS)
Feldman, Daniel F. (MULTI)

TEXT_BODY

Matt:

I see your point. Sounds good to me. Thanks for the quick turn-around on this.

- Ken

-----Original Message-----

From: Schaefer,
Matthew P. (INTECON)
Sent: Wednesday, October 06, 1999 10:06 PM
To: Pollack,
Kenneth M. (NESA)
Cc: Jones, Felicia A. (NESA); Guarnieri, Valerie
N. (MULTI); Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS); Feldman, Daniel F. (MULTI)
Subject: RE:
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October 06, 1999 7:07 PM

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Kenneth M. (NESA); Guarnieri, Valerie N. (MULTI); Shapiro, Daniel

B. (LEGIS); @HAMMONDS

Subject: FW: #7133 Response to Governor

Schafer on Iran [UNCLASSIFIED]

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October 05, 1999 3:23 PM

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Cc: @MULTILAT

- Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs; @LEGISLAT - Legislative

Affairs; @INTECON - Economic Affairs; @NESASIA - NE/South Asia

Subject: FW:

#7133 Response to Governor Schafer on Iran [UNCLASSIFIED]

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Felicia A. (NESA)

Sent: Tuesday, October 05, 1999 12:46 PM

To: Guarnieri,

Valerie N. (MULTI); Shapiro, Daniel B. (LEGIS); Schaefer, Matthew

P. (INTECON)

Cc: @INTECON - Economic Affairs; @MULTILAT - Multilateral

and Humanitarian Affairs; @NESASIA - NE/South Asia

Subject: #7133

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<< File:
7133srb.doc >> << File: 7133ltr.doc >> << File: 7133bc.doc >>

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
001. email	Eric Rubin to David Johnson, re: Iran Guidance (3 pages)	05/27/1997	P1/b(1)
002. email	James Seaton to Steven Andreasen, re: WHSR Morning Summary 30 May 1997 (3 pages)	05/30/1997	P1/b(1)
003. email	Robert Suettinger to John Norris, re: Responding to Hoagland on China (6 pages)	06/05/1997	P5
004. email	Richard Clarke to Bruce Riedel, re: berger list (2 pages)	06/24/1997	P1/b(1)
005. email	Marc Koehler to Marianna Papadimitriou, re: FW: Khobar-related Cables (2 pages)	07/20/1997	P1/b(1)
006. email	Marc Koehler to Marianna Papadimitriou, re: [Khobar cable distribution] (1 page)	07/20/1997	P1/b(1)
007. email	Mary McCarthy to Steven Simon, re: RE: [Report] (1 page)	07/22/1997	P1/b(1)
008. email	Steven Simon to Beverly Roundtree and Kenneth Baldwin, re: [#4974] (6 pages)	07/22/1997	P1/b(1)
009. email	Beverly Roundtree to Bruce Riedel, re: Clearance Request ASAP (7 pages)	07/22/1997	P1/b(1)
010. email	Steven Simon to Beverly Roundtree, re: Information Memorandum for NSC (7 pages)	07/22/1997	P1/b(1)
011. email	Richard Clarke to Beverly Roundtree, re: please fix (15 pages)	07/22/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Khobar])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/27/1997 - 07/25/1997]

Kara Ellis
2006-0648-F
ke916

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
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- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- b(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

WJC LIBRARY COPY

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

Clinton Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
012. email	Beverly Roundtree to Kathleen Cooper, re: I DID NOT FORGET - Here's the Memo (7 pages)	07/23/1997	P1/b(1)

COLLECTION:

Clinton Presidential Records
NSC Emails
Exchange-Non-Record (Mar 97-Jan 01) ([Khobar])
OA/Box Number: 630000

FOLDER TITLE:

[05/27/1997 - 07/25/1997]

Kara Ellis
2006-0648-F
ke916

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
- P2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
- P3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
- P4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
- P5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
- P6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Personal record misfile defined in accordance with 44 U.S.C. 2201(3).

RR. Document will be reviewed upon request.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- b(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- b(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- b(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- b(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- b(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- b(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- b(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
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Exchange Mail

DATE-TIME 6/5/97 2:33:39 PM
FROM Suettinger, Robert L.
CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT Responding to Hoagland on China [UNCLASSIFIED]
TO Norris, John J.

CARBON_COPY

TEXT_BODY John -- Here's a synopsis of Hoagland's last few articles, and my recommendations on China replies.

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

HOAGLAND.DOC

Below are brief summaries of Hoagland's most critical columns over the last year:

Administration's China Policy

Administration fear of criticizing China (and other unsavory regimes) betrays its assessment that China is too touchy and fragile to be dressed down in public -- US has the power of the 1600 Penn Avenue bully pulpit and should use it to call attention to nations' flagrant misdeeds. (attach. 1)

Albright promised to tell China "like it is", but promptly retreated behind a verbal smokescreen of "multifaceted relationships." (attach. 2)

Clinton's supineness, indulgence and appeasement of China have convinced it that it can bluster and bully without paying a price -- e.g. its ominous military buildup, including acquisition of specific weapons and drawing up of contingency battle plans that will be targeted on US forward deployed units in the Pacific, accelerated purchases of Russian built warships, surface to surface missiles and warplanes that underscore its ambition to reduce US ability to constrain its actions in Asia. (3, 4)

Source of Hoagland's venom on Clinton China policy: he was in Tiananmen during the demonstrations. USG policy makers wrongly predicted then Deng wouldn't order troops to shoot students. Deng rightly predicted that West wouldn't stand in the way of trade and political relations. White House high profile political embrace of China makes it an accomplice to organized lying. (4a)

Korea

Draws on Nicholas Eberstadt position that North Korea will continue to grow economically poorer and militarily more dangerous, so faster, more orderly reunification is in the interests of all parties. (attach. 5)

Middle East

The new dynamic in the Middle East is that Netanyahu has taken Clinton's measure and doesn't fear overwhelming US pressure in a showdown. (6)

If Iran found to be behind Khobar, Clinton must act. Justice and retribution, not policy and diplomacy, must be the driving force in such a decision. (7)

Clinton abandoned Kurds to Saddam -- two competing CIA operations canceled each other out and helped Saddam create the strategic vacuum in the north and set the Kurdish tribes at each other again. (8,9)

Arafat's self-defeating censorship efforts in jailing journalist Daoud Kuttub. (10)

Russia

Russians seem to be unfazed by the country's political instability and focused instead on the larger forces reshaping the society. This is good. (11)

Yeltsin, Kohl and Clinton have fashioned a set of personal engagements that suit their immediate political needs -- this has bought them the NATO-Russia understanding. But shouldn't confuse personal trust with long-term strategy. (12)

Bosnia

Clinton has put US involvement in Bosnia in the right strategic perspective, so why is Cohen lashing himself to the mast of an ironclad withdrawal date this far in advance? (13)

Global Capitalism

Money dominates as the defining principle of human and international relations in the postmodern political era. Need more attention by our leaders to history, ethics, morality and the larger purpose of politics and public service. (14)

Clinton's commercial diplomacy is the pursuit of narrow economic advantage and will further spawn corrupt practices throughout the emerging economies. (15)

Clinton's Foreign Policy

Foreign policy can save his legacy if he can get the big things right and project his core beliefs. (16, 16a)

The "world's indispensable superpower" stands on the sidelines where America's interests are vital and withdrawal is not an option. Episodic engagement in foreign policy. (17)

Key foreign policy challenges lie in the Gulf, the Mediterranean, Central Asia, Balkans, Africa -- NATO enlargement notwithstanding. (18)

TRANSLATED_ATTACHMENT

HOAGTALK.DOC

Responding to Hoagland on China

Difficult to do, given admittedly subjective nature of his views, inconsistency and vagueness of alternative proposals, inductive logic used. Suggest you preview your CFR speech, which is good comprehensive, thoughtful presentation of China policy. What follows is a couple themes of Hoagland's

commentary.

"Supineness, indulgence and appeasement" of President on China.

Room for disagreement on very difficult policy toward very important country, but this in no way accurate characterization of U.S. policy. Have been critical of China on human rights, on non-proliferation, on trade, other issues. Have taken actions in Taiwan Strait, on IPR, on non-proliferation.

Recognize need for strategic approach to relationship but have not tried to ignore problems in bilateral relationship -- not good relations for their own sake. Working to solve real problems, some success achieved; not all we wanted, but believe course we have adopted achieving results.

Administration afraid to criticize China due to fragile relationship. Should use the "bully pulpit."

Criticism important, has been used frequently. Keep goals in mind -- criticism should support them. Not just vent feelings about government whose form, attitudes, behavior, ideology we don't like. Purpose is to bring about change, get China to accept, abide by international norms in trade, nonproliferation, human rights. Process takes time, patience, willingness to work behind scenes on occasion.

China a shame culture. Public criticism needs to be used carefully. Often breeds resentment, anger, desire for revenge -- counter-productive to bring about change of sort we want.

China's military buildup the real "China scandal" -- designed to make it impossible for U.S. to constrain its ambitions in Asia.

Watching China's military activity carefully. Not afraid of it, no particular reason to confront or try to contain it at this point. Tools are available --

Pacific Fleet without peer; China no match for US in any military area
-- they
know it. Keep military engagement in region, maintain alliances.
Sufficient
without being unnecessarily provocative.

China may want to be able to offset U.S. militarily, but only in
relation to
Taiwan -- China's most neuralgic issue. Ambition is Asia is influence,
not
control. Not using military power to achieve goal. Spratlys actions
(military
ship passages) a reminder of its claim, not a threat. Asian countries
look to
U.S. to stay engaged in region, but do not want us to take
confrontational
approach.

Chinese military spending up, but not across the board, and after years
of budget
cuts. Actually downsizing ground forces, working to develop air,
naval
capabilities. Purchases from Russia (aircraft, Sovremnyy class
destroyers)
worrisome, but appear geared toward Taiwan -- not long range power
projection.
But we'll watch it carefully.

Administration cooperation with China makes accomplice to the lie of
Tiananmen

Nonsense. U.S. has never accepted China's version of Tiananmen
events, do not do
so now. Tiananmen sanctions still in place; regularly call for release
of
Tiananmen-era political prisoners. Truth will come out, matter of
time; Chinese
people demand it, we support that demand. Still have to work with
current
government. Not seeking to overthrow it. Change is our goal -- what's
the best
way to achieve it? China has come a long way in last 20 years; still a
long way
to go. Trying to isolate, punish may make us feel good, but won't do
much to
change China. Engage, educate, empower, encourage trends for
change. Way to do
that may not be public, confrontational. May be quiet, behind-the-
scenes.
Combination of work with government, support for its critics.

No simple answers about nation of over 1 billion. Don't delude ourselves by searching for them. We're trying to deal with realities -- often not what we'd like them to be.